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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PAROL EVIDENCE
IN NORTH CAROLINA
JOHN

P.

DALZELL*

"Get the agreement in \vriting, signed by the other man, but leave
out one or two of the important provisions; depend on his oral promise
for those items." That would seem to be the policy followed in a surprising number of cases, and leading to the litigation which has confused
the law on one of the obviously sensible rules of our common law system.
The parties sign and deliver a formal document stating their contract
in detail, giving every indication of being a completely final record thereof, and yet they deliberately omit one part of the transaction. If man
were always a reasonable animal, the parol evidence rule would offer no
serious problem in statement or application, especially if he were reasonable as judged in the light of later developments. As it is, our court decisions on the rule have left the law in confusion, and the ablest legal
minds have studied the cases only to achieve disagreement as to what the
law is, or should be.
In this state, the North Carolina Supreme Court has often stated the
rule in the traditional phraseology and emphasized its importance; but
the only detailed study of the local decisions reached this conclusion in
1931: "The North Carolina court in a long line of cases has abrogated
the parol evidence rule for most purposes." 1
The purpose of this article is to look at the developments in the same
field since 1931. Startling changes in the common law are hardly to be
expected in a quarter of a century; but it may be helpful to attempt to
bring such a valuable survey up to date.A
I. THE RULE AND ITS PURPOSE
The parol evidence rule as generally recognized may be stated as
follows:
When the parties have (1) made a valid contract, and (2) have
approved a writing as the final, complete statement of the con* Professor of Law, The University of North Carolina School of Law.

1Chadbourn and McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina, 9
N. C. L. REv., 151, 156 (1931). This article is cited in 9 WIGMORE, EViDENCE
§ 2425 n. 1 (3d ed. 1946) and in 3 COPBIN, CoNTaRcrs p. 265, n. 76 (1951) ; the

latter writer expresses the opinion that a similar survey in other states would
show much the same liberality toward parol evidence, and confusion in the de-

cisions, as was found in North Carolina.

" [To illustrate the development of the parol evidence rule, cases are cited in
chronological order-Ed.]
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tract, that writing supersedes every other prior and contemporaneous term and agreement between the parties relating to the sub2
ject matter.
The written record approved as the final embodiment of the agreement has been commonly called an "integration" ever since Wigmore
first used the term in that sense. The purpose of the rule is to give
effect to the intent of the parties. They have made their agreement
in writing in order to have a record of the contract terms that is precise,
permanent and reliable. They intend the integregation as protection
against forgetfulness and against falsehood. The parol evidence rule
is aimed to achieve that objective.
The statute of frauds was a legislative device aimed at the same
objective; for decades it has been criticized by courts and other authorities as causing more fraud than it prevents. 3 But no such attack has
been made upon the parol evidence rule, except in Corbin's treatise on
Contracts,where the statement is that the rule has done more harm than
good.4 This court-made rule has been generally recognized as a sensible, necessary protection for the man who is prudent enough to insist on
paper and ink rather than oral promises dissolving in air. Even the
decision which refuses to apply the rule often goes out of its way to
comment on the wisdom inherent in the rule within its proper limitations.
II.

PAROL EVIDENCE AS TO VALIDITY

Before applying the rule, the court must determine that a valid contract was made. On any point essential to validity then, parol evidence
-evidence outside the writing-is acceptable and indeed necessary.
If conditional delivery is claimed, the writing itself can hardly give
the answer. Delivery can never be proved by the language of the instrument involved; for delivery of the instrument cannot take place
until after the instrument is completed. Any words in a writing purporting to characterize delivery of that writing can only be a forecast of
future events; they can speak only of that which is to come after the
words are written. The North Carolina position allowing parol evidence
to prove conditional delivery, even where the writing expressly specified
'For more detailed statements of the rule, see 3 WxaSToN, CONTRACTs § 632
(Rev. ed. 1936) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 237 (1932) ; 3 CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs
§ 573 (1951); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202 (1952).

' See the Report of the English Law Revision Committee on the Statute of
Frauds, 15 CAN. B. Rzv. 585, 593 (1937).
'3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 575 (1951). The more usual evaluation of the rule
is that indicated in a North Carolina decision as "a principle which has always
been considered one of the greatest barriers against fraud and perjury. * * * [T]he
wise rules which are intended for the protection of the provident should not be
refined away for the relief of the negligent." Moffitt v. Maness, 102 N. C. 456,
459, 9 S.E. 399, 401 (1889).
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that delivery should be absolute and unconditional, is quite logical.5
Parol evidence is also proper to prove illegality of the agreement.0
Fraud or misrepresentation making the contract voidable is, of course,
provable by parol. 7 There is no substantial doubt, in this state or elsewhere, that the court should consider evidence outside the writing which
bears upon any of these factors concerned with the validity of the contract, and upon some other issues referred to in the notes.8

III.

EFFECT OF EXPRESS MERGER CLAUSE

It is likewise essential to the application of the parol evidence rule
that the parties have assented to a document as a final, complete repository of the terms of their contract. Whether such assent has been given
is clearly a question of intent of the parties-intent that is externally
indicated, communicated, and so contractually effective. If the document states the necessary intent, saying "every term of our contract is
fully stated herein," or words to that effect, there is an express integration, and, generally, no further problem, for the rule applies and any
promises or conditions not in the document are not part of the contract.
The North Carolina decisions are fairly consistent in such cases. At
least in cases which appear from the official report to belong in that category, there has been little tendency to allow parol evidence either to add
to or to vary a term.9 This was brought home to the laundryman sued
on a contract for the purchase of new presses, who alleged an oral
guaranty that they would be more efficient and economical than his old
equipment. The salesman must have used some such language-he
would hardly be a salesman if he did not make so modest a claim; probably he guaranteed as much in positive terms as the defendant alleged.
But the contract signed by the laundryman included these words:
"This . . .contract constitutes ... the entire agreement between
the parties .... There are no representations, agreements, prom'Wilson v. Stndard Fertilizer Co., 203 N. C. 359, 166 S. E. 76 (1932) ; Roberson v. Swain, 235 N. C. 50, 69 S. E. 2d 15 (1952).. In Jefferson Standard Life
Ins. Co. v. Morehead, 209 N. C. 174, 183 S.E. 606 (1936), the writing negatived
conditional delivery, but parol evidence of conditional delivery was allowed. The
conservative authorities would not allow parol evidence of conditional delivery, when
the writing contains express language inconsistent therewith: 3 WILLIsToN, CoxTRACTS § 634 (Rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS § 241 (1932).
" Usury proved by parol, Pugh v. Scarboro, 200 N. C. 59, 156 S.E. 149 (1930).
"Willett
v. National Accident etc. Ins. Co., 208 N. C. 355, 180 S.E. 580 (1935) ;
Anderson Cotton Mills v. Royal Mfg. Co., 218 N. C. 560, 11 S.E. 2d 550 (1940).
(The latter case was a tort action for deceit.)
'As to interpretation: Robinson v. Benton, 201 N. C. 712, 161 S.E. 208 (1931);
Owens v. Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co., 206 N. C. 864, 175 S.E. 203 (1934). As
to mistake, in case seeking reformation: Robinson v. Benton, supra; Alexander v.
Virginia-Carolina J. S. Land Bank, 201 N. C. 449, 160 S. E. 460 (1931); Life
Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Edgerton, 206 N. C. 402, 174 S. E. 96 (1934); Ollis v.
Board of Education of Avery County, 210 N. C. 489, 187 S.E. 772 ( 193 d).
"A possible exception is Colgate Co. v. Latta, 115 N. C. 127, 20 S.E. 388
(1894).
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ises or warranties relating to the subject matter of this contract
other than expressed herein."
The court was unanimous in holding that any defense based on a breach
of the alleged parol warranty was barred by the parol evidence rule.10
When the purchaser signed the order containing those statements, he
clearly agreed that any assurances expressed by the salesman, if not in
the writing, were not in the contract.
The defense in an action on a stock subscription contract met the
same answer. The agreement concluded with this paragraph:
"No representations, statements or agreements other than as
herein recited have been made, or are binding on said corporation,
and my entire contract is herein expressed."
The subscriber-defendant claimed that he was induced to sign only by
oral representations. The court said the alleged representations were
all promissory, and that, in the absence of fraud, evidence thereof was
properly excluded.1
In neither of these cases did any direct contradiction appear between
the parol evidence and a specific term (other than the merger clause) in
the writing. The written contract for the sale of laundry machinery
certainly did not read: "The seller does not warrant this equipment to
be any improvement over the old equipment which it replaces." The
enforcement of the alleged parol warranty would not conflict with any
of the terms in the writing other than the merger clause itself. That
is the course approved, in such a situation, by many North Carolina
decisions, in the absence of a merger clause ;12 but such a clause prevents any addition.
If the parol evidence faces not only a merger clause but also a direct,
specific contradiction elsewhere in the writing, the parol evidence is, of
course, the more likely to be discarded. The purchaser of an automobile,
who financed the purchase by a chattel mortgage on the car naming the
seller as mortgagee but intended for immediate assignment to the finance
company, offered parol evidence that the finance company promised to
insure the car. The chattel mortgage, however, stipulated that the mortgagee was under no duty to secure any insurance and the mortgage contained- a merger clause. The conclusion of the court was that "the
" American Laundry Machinery Co. v. Skinner, 225 N. C. 285, 34 S. E. 2d 190
(1945). The court was divided as to the defense of fraud, holding four to three
that the statements of the salesman as to how the machinery would perform were
not misrepresentations of fact.
"'Elizabeth City Hotel Corporation v. Overman, 201 N. C. 337, 160 S. E. 289
(1931).
"2See p. 428 in!ra.
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writings supersede the oral agreements of the parties and express their
3
actual agreements."'
Applying the Parol Evidence Rule as Evidence Law
The express merger clause in one North Carolina contract was without effect however, because of the tendency in the court to treat the
parol evidence rule as a rule of evidence, as its name suggests. One
point on which all the ablest students of the rule are agreed-Wigmore
and Williston, Thayer before, and Corbin after them-is that the name
of the rule is misleading. It is not a part of our procedural law of
evidence; it is substantive law fixing the limits of contract rights. Wigmore states:
"It is not a rule of Evidence because it has nothing to do with the
probative value of one fact as persuading us of the probable
existence of another fact ....

It is a rule of substantive law, be-

cause it deals with the question where and in what sources and
materials are to be found the terms [of a contract]."'14
Nonetheless, the North Carolina court generally regards the parol
evidence rule as a rule of evidence; and that theory has led to a decision
within the last twenty-five years admitting parol evidence in the face of
an express integration agreement.
The action was to collect for a tractor bought on a written order
including a merger clause in these words:
"This order . . . is understood to be our entire contract. * * *

[T]he above warranties ... are agreed to be the only warranties,
given in lieu of all implied warranties."
The defense, in spite of the above language, was breach of an implied
warranty that the tractor was suitable for use in logging operations. The
court saw the case as centered around evidence that the plaintiff-seller
knew that the tractor was being bought for logging operations. Defendant offered such evidence; plaintiff objected, but later testified
himself that he had such knowledge. The court did not deny that defendant was attempting to change the integrated contract by parol evidence. Nevertheless, it held that plaintiff, by his own evidence on the
matter, waived his objection to the parol evidence, so that the contract
was changed by this evidence and the judgment was for the defendant
on the ground of breach of warranty.
"The plaintiff contends that the written contract between the
parties as to warranties and representations cannot be varied by
'" Wilkins v. Commercial Finance Co., 237 N. C. 396, 403, 75 S. E. 2d 118, 124
(1953).

"49 WIGMORE, EVMENCE p.

76 (3d ed., 1950).
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oral testimony. This principle is not applicable on the present
record. Plaintiff introduced the written 'warranty and agreement'
and in his testimony stated on cross examination: 'I sold him the
tractor for use in logging operations and understood he was going to use it for logging.' * * * All of the above evidence of
plaintiff indicates that the tractor was sold to be used in logging.
It is well settled that an objection to evidence is immaterial
where the same evidence is later admitted without objection."' 5
The integration here included an express warranty, and specifically
excluded "all implied warranties." The effect of this decision was to
hold that because the seller knew the tractor was being purchased for
use in logging operations, he warranted its fitness for that use, though
the buyer agreed in a written sale contract that there should be no
such warranty; in other words, in this respect the parties could not
decide for themselves what their contract obligations were to be.' 6
Without doubt there was evidence before the court that the seller knew
the purpose for which the tractor was purchased; but the question was
what effect that evidence had on the contract signed by the parties. The
conclusion which the court drew that there was a warranty of fitness,
when the buyer had signed a written contract expressly negativing all
implied warranties, seems supportable only on the theory that if the
seller knows the purpose for which the article is bought, he cannot escape
a warranty of fitness for that purpose, even though the buyer clearly
renounces such warranty in the contract. The decision illustrates the
unfortunate results which may follow from looking upon the parol evidence rule as controlling simply what evidence is properly in the record,
rather than as indicating what effect that evidence has on the contract
17
rights of the parties.
IV.

WRITTEN AGREEMENTS WITHOUT MERGER CLAUSE

In the cases where there is a merger clause there is no serious prob"Edgerton v. Johnson, 217 N. C. 314, 317-318, 7 S. E. 2d 535, 537 (1940). The
buyer-defendant succeeded in getting into the record evidence that his son had been
killed while operating the tractor, in an accident which the buyer claimed was
caused by the unsuitability, of the tractor for logging operations.
"Williston speaks of implied warranties of quality in words suggesting that
they are not within the parties' control: "[T]he implied warranty is not based on
a supposed agreement of the parties, but is an obligation imposed by law." 1
WILLISTON, SALES p. 627 (Rev. ed. 1948). However, it is plain from the context
(as in § 239 c, p. 628) that he does not mean that the parties cannot relieve the
seller of all liability on implied warranties, by clearly stating that to be their
intent, but rather that the amplied warranty is based upon an implication of fact
clearly recognized by a rule of law.
1' In Smithfield Mills v. Stevens, 204 N. C. 382, 384, 168 S. E. 201, 202 (1933),
the court also held an objection based on the parol evidence rule was waived by
the objecting party introducing his own evidence on the matter, in this case evidence denying the truth of the parol evidence earlier offered.
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lem. The parties having declared their intent in the writing, having
said in effect "any term ont set out over our signatures is not a part
of our contract." The instrument is, of course, to be treated as an integration, and the parol evidence rule will generally be applied in its
broadest form, in North Carolina as elsewhere. But if there is no such
express statement in the writing, what test or standard should be applied to determine whether the parties intended the document to be a
complete integration, or only a partial integration? At this point the
courts experience some difficulty and the text writers disagree. To make
the problem concrete: a written contract for the sale of a tract of country land is made only after the seller promises to remove an old icehouse from another tract across the road. The signed instrument contains no merger clause, and no reference to the ice-house. Is the absence of such reference properly to be taken as an indication that the
parties abandoned that contract term? In theory, at least, the basic
question is not what the parties intended at the time they signed the
document, but what intent they indicated; for in forming a contract, it
is the intent communicated outwardly that is controlling.
The conservative view treats the writing as a complete integration,
just as if it contained a merger clause, unless it appears on its face to be
incomplete. Williston reasons that the intention of the parties on this
matter must be drawn from the writing:
"[I]f the court may seek this intention from intrinsic circumstances, the very fact that the parties made a contemporaneous
oral agreement will of itself prove that they did not intend the
writing to be a complete memorial. The only question open would
be whether such a contemporaneous oral agreement was in fact
made. * * * [T]he practical value of the rule would be much
impaired if either party to a writing were allowed to rebut the
presumption by proof of any contemporaneous oral agreement.
Certainly the law does not permit this. The question arises
chiefly where it is asserted not that there is no integration at all,
but only a partial integration. It is generally held that the contract must appear on its face to be incomplete in order to permit
8
parol evidence of additional terms."'
He approved the statement by Finch, J.:
"If we may go outside of the instrument to prove that there was a
stipulation not contained in it, and so that only a part of the
contract was put in writing, and then, because of that fact, enforce
183 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS pp.

1820-21 (Rev. ed. 1936).
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the oral stipulation, there will be little of value left in the rule
itself."19
The Williston rule seems appealing in its simplicity of application;
but Corbin and Wigmore reject this solution. Both state emphatically
that the writing canot prove its own completeness.20 The question of
whether the parties intended the writing to supersede the disputed parol
agreement, according to Wigmore and Corbin, must be determined not
simply by examination of the writing to decide whether it appears to be
complete, but by examination of the alleged parol agreement and the
writing. This decides whether the writing, construed in the light of all
the circumstances, indicates an intent to approve it as a complete integration, thus superseding the alleged parol agreement, or an intent to
leave that parol agreement still effective as part of the transaction.21
The ice-house case, the example suggested above, confronted the
New York Court of Appeals, and produced conflicting opinions, each
of which seems, as it is read, to give the only right answer. The
vendee liked the farm which was for sale, but not the vendor's old ice-'
house facing it across the road. The vendor agreed to remove the old
building, and a written sale contract was made which was silent both
as to the ice-house and as to merger. The farm was conveyed, but the
seller refused to move the ice-house, and the vendee brought an action
to enforce the promise of removal. The court expressed no doubt that
the oral promise had been made, but added that this was immaterial.
The majority of the Court (including Chief Judge Cardozo) denied
effect to the oral agreement, on the ground that the writing, read in the
light of the circumstances-including the knowledge that the purchaser
objected to the ice-house-suggested only one conclusion: that it set
forth everything agreed upon between the parties. Any agreement for
removal of the ice-house was so closely related to the subject matter of
the writing that it would normally be included in the writing if made;
being excluded from the writing, it could not be treated as part of the
sale agreement. The opinion conceded that the rule worked occasional
injustice, but "on the whole it works for good." 22 The dissent, by two
members of the court, agreed with the standard approved by the majority, but not with its application to the case. The minority opinion
Eighmie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288, 294 (1885).
203 CoRBIN, CONmRACTS § 582 (1951) ; 9 WiGmoy, EvIDENcE § 2431 (3d ed.
1940).
219 WiGMolE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940); 3 CoRBIN, CONTRAcrs § 582
(1951) ; Chadbourn and McCormick, op. cit. supra n. 1 at p. 155. Williston concedes that some writings are partial integrations only, and approves a similar
standard for distinguishing such cases; 3

1936).

WIUsToN,

CoxTRAcrs p. 1834 (Rev. ed.

22 Mitchill v. Latch, 247 N. Y. 377, 380, 160 N: E. 646, 647, 68 A. L. R. 239,
240 (1928).
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conceded that the written contract in no way suggested that it was incomplete; but reasoned that the subject of the writing was the transfer
of one tract of land, while the subject of the parol agreement was removal of an eye-sore from another tract not to be conveyed-a matter
so separate that it might reasonably be dealt with outside the conveyance
23
agreement.
The North. Carolina court would have agreed with the minority, for
its parol evidence rule is certainly not the rule supported by Williston,
and in some decisions it seems to afford the written contract even less
protection than does the rule stated by Corbin and Wigmore. As
pointed out in the earlier article, 24 there is a tendency in North Carolina when parol evidence is offered as affecting a written contract without a merger clause, to handle it in two questions, one for the court, the
other for the jury. First, the court would decide whether there was any
necessary contradiction between the parol evidence and the writing, such
total inconsistency as would make co-existence of the written agreement
and the oral agreement impossible. If no contradiction were found, the
jury is left to say whether the alleged oral agreement was made; if so,
it is enforced. For if the oral agreement was made, it is concluded that
the writing was incomplete, a partial integration only.
This seems to mean that the situation described in the above quotation from Williston's treatise, and apparently regarded by him as a
reductio ad absurdum, has prevailed in North Carolina courts: "[T]he
very fact that the parties made a contemporaneous oral agreement" has
of itself been taken as proof "that they did not intend the writing to be
a complete memorial." The only question open was "whether such a
''24
contemporaneous oral agreement was in fact made. 1
In other words, though the North Carolina court often states the
parol evidence rule in its traditional form as a bar to any prior or contemporaneous agreement which "adds to, varies, or contradicts" the
writing,25 the rule actually applied here in many cases seems to allow
parol evidence which adds to the writing without contradicting it. This
is the tendency since 1931 as well as before.
Sale Contracts Without Merger Clause
The parol evidence rule has been invoked, and the North Carolina
version applied, in the usual number of sales contract cases within the
last twenty-five years. The evidence has been received or excluded de"id. at 384, 160 N. E. at 648, 68 A. L. R. at 242.
24 Chadbourn and McCormick, op. cit. supra n. 1 at p. 157.
2
IaWILLISTON, CONTRACTS pp. 1820-21 (Rev. ed. 1936).

2 The decision in what is possibly the leading North Carolina case on the parol

evidence rule exemplifies both the classic statement of the rule, and its distortion
in this state: Evans v. Freeman, 142 N. C. 61, 64, 54 S. E. 847, 848 (1906).

1955]

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PAROL EVIDENCE

429

pending on whether it appeared to the court to be consistent or inconsistent with some term of the written contract. In Snithfield Mills v.
Steveits 6 the court saw no contradiction, and allowed the evidence to
be considered. Plaintiff had given defendant-brokers several written
orders for the purchase of cotton on margin. The writings were silent
as to further margin, but plaintiff alleged that when the orders were
given, defendant-brokers had agreed to furnish additional margin if it
became necessary. The court said the parol evidence was not "totally
inconsistent with the sales agreements introduced in evidence,"2' 6 and
was therefore admissible.
On the other hand the farmer who complained because his written
order for corn and cotton fertilizer did not bring him tobacco fertilizer
found no relief. He claimed that his only need was for tobacco fertilizer, that the seller-defendant knew that fact and promised to deliver
tobacco fertilizer; but the court pointed out the inconsistency between
the written order which the farmer-plaintiff signed, and the parol evi27
dence, and refused to consider the latter.
The distinction between evidence which adds a term and evidence
which contradicts is not always clear. Where a written contract called
for the sale of 145 acres for $14,000, and the vendee claimed another
thirteen acres because the preceding oral agreement had been to sell
158 acres for $14,000, this parol evidence was held to conflict with the
writing, and was rejected.28 On petition for rehearing, however, the
court decided that parol evidence should be heard in support of plaintiff's
claim that the written contract was understood by both parties to cover
some farming implements, though the writing spoke only of land. In
other words, parol evidence which adds thirteen acres to the 145 described in the writing is inconsistent therewith; but parol evidence which
adds farm implements is an addition, not a contradiction. 29 This distinction did not satisfy the entire court, as there was vigorous dissent
by three justices, who would have excluded the evidence as to the farm
implements. But the distinction which the court recognized is not unreasonable, and it may well be consistent with the Wigmore test of in20204 N. C. 382, 168 S. E. 201 (1933).
2""IId. at 384, 168 S. E. at 202.
,Winstead v. Acme Mfg. Co., 207 N. C. 110, 176 S. E. 304 (1934). Leave to
amend and allege fraud was denied. If plaintiff had proved that defendant-seller
knew the fertilizer was being bought for a field of tobacco, the theory of Edgerton
v. Johnson, 217 N. C. 314, 7 S. E. 2d 535 (1940), would seem to make the seller
liable for breach of warranty.
8Williams v. McLean, 220 N. C. 504, 17 S. E. 2d 644 (1941). The 145 acres
had been conveyed and paid for; plaintiff claimed a constructive trust as to the
13 acres.
"9Williams v. McLean, 221 N. C. 228, 19 S. E. 2d 867 (1942).
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tegration.30

Parties who were closing a sale of 158 acres of contiguous
farm land and a number of farm implements would be much less likely
to omit 13 acres of the contiguous farm land from their written contract
than to omit all reference to the farm implements. The implements are
a quite different type of property from the land, and might not be
grouped with the land in the normal thinking of layman or lawyer.
Farm implements were again the subject of the parol evidence as
well as the writing before the court in another case ten years later. The
action was to collect a balance due for a tractor and two attachments, as
shown in a receipt acknowledging delivery signed by the defendant. The
defense was failure to deliver two other attachments, a cultivator and a
distributor, which the purchaser claimed had been promised and were
essential. The terms of the receipt were not set out, but the court
treated the case as a parol evidence problem, and held the evidence
admissible, saying part of the contract was oral. 31
In Mills v. Boni, 32 the decision is easier to understand than the
reasoning. According to defendant's evidence, he and plaintiff agreed
that the latter's interest in a partnership should be transferred to defendant at its net worth. An audit showed that figure as $7,000 to
$9,000, and on that basis a bill of sale was signed which fixed the price
at $6,800, payable mostly in notes. A few weeks after the transfer, it
was discovered that the audit was erroneous, and that the plaintiff had
overdrawn his account so that the net worth of his interest was zero
or less. The action was to collect on the notes, the defense was total
failure of consideration, and the court held that defense to be provable
by parol evidence of the oral agreement which led to the written bill of
sale. The court quoted from Fairv. Shelton a3 to the effect that where
both parties assume erroneously that the grantor has title, the consideration has failed, but otherwise where the purchase is of "such right, title
and interest as grantor might have." It is not often that the language
quoted in support of a decision seems to point so clearly to the opposite
decision, for the bill of sale in Mills v. Bonin, describing the property
sold, used the limiting words, "all his right, title and interest in and to
the partnership assets," yet the holding was that parol evidence was
admissible as to the extent of the interest to be transferred. Perhaps
there was relievable misrepresentation or mistake, but the decision was
not on either theory.
" For apparent approval of a similar distinction based upon the difference
between real and personal property, see 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE p. 99, n. 4 (3d ed.
1940).
"McLawhon v. Briley, 234 N. C. 394, 67 S. E. 2d 285 (1951).
"239 N. C. 498, 80 S. E. 2d 365 (1954).
3 128 N. C. 105, 38 S. E. 290 (1901).
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Miscellaneous Contracts
Decisions in North Carolina on contracts other than sales agreements, since 1931, have been somewhat less lenient in treating parol
evidence as consistent with the written contract and so admissible.
A lease for a billiard parlor was accompanied, according to the lessee, by
the lessor's oral undertaking not to lease other space in his building
for use as a billiard parlor. This would hardly seem to be inconsistent
with the terms of the written lease, but the evidence was excluded, the
court quoting the classical prohibition against parol evidence "to contradict, add to, take away from or in any way vary the terms of a contract put in writing."34
A written employment contract described only as stating the hourly
rate to be paid, was held not to include a parol agreement as to duration
of the employment. The court said such evidence was "at variance with
the written contract and therefore incompetent. '3 5 A trust agreement
among the stockholders of a family corporation provided that none of
the stock was to be sold without the consent of all. Evidence was
offered of a parol agreement that on the death of any one, his stock
should become the property of other members of the family. In the
course of holding this a passive trust, the court stated that this evidence
was inadmissible, as an attempt to contradict and vary the written instrument. 36 In all of these cases the court might, with some reason, have
held that the parol evidence was not inconsistent with the writing, but
simply established an additional term.
One of the North Carolina cases on separation agreements between
husband and wife illustrates a situation where the parol evidence rule
should not be applied for the reason that the omission of the parol agreement from the writing was understandable in the circumstances. The
written property settlement was allegedly made partly in consideration
for an oral undertaking that no divorce proceeding or. other litigation
should be brought upon any allegations which would reflect unfavorably
upon the character of the wife. Under the circumstances, it was quite
understandable that this oral agreement was omitted from the writing in
order to escape publicity. Such omission might well be the normal
"Sakellaris v. Wyche, 205 N. C. 173, 170 S. E. 638 (1933). Parol evidence

varying the expiration date stated in the written lease was excluded in Stewart v.
Thrower, 212 N. C. 541, 193 S. E. 701 (1937).
" Sherill v. Graham County, 205 N. C. 178, 170 S. E. 636 (1933). The excluded parol evidence was plainly inconsistent with the writing in two service contract cases, both involving real estate dealers' commissions: Cathey v. Shope, 238
N. C. 345, 78 S. E. 2d 135 (1953), and Neal v. Marrone, 239 N. C. 73, 79 S. E.
2d 239 (1953) ; in the latter case the defendant unsuccessfully offering the parol
evidence was illiterate.
" Security National Bank v. Sternberger, 207 N. C. 811, 821, 178 S. E. 595, 601
(1935).
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course of procedure, and consequently should not be treated as indicating abandonment of the term, by Wigmore's test. The court admitted
the evidence, but relied on the standard North Carolina reasoning that
since the oral promise was made, the writing was not a complete integration.3 7 In another separation agreement case, parol evidence that the
husband promised a share in certain business property if he sold it was
excluded where the writing said the wife surrendered all property rights
based upon the marital relation in exchange for what she received under
the terms of the writing.38
Deeds
It is recognized that the formal instrument conveying land may not
include all the less important incidental terms agreed upon; thus parol
evidence of such minor matters is more likely to be received where the
writing is a deed. 39 But a deed conveying a right of way to a railroad
was not allowed to be shown by parol to have been limited so that the
railroad could not use it except to serve the grantor's property. 40 Nor
could the usual warranty against incumbrances be extended by parol to
cover liens accruing in the future for street improvements already
41
made.
In one respect the recent years have seen North Carolina turning
toward a view generally accepted elsewhere. Parol evidence to prove
that a deed was in fact a mortgage was formerly rejected in North
Carolina. 42 The case of O'Briant v. Lee4 3 held that where there was a
deed and an option to reconvey, it may be shown to have been in fact
a mortgage, this merely proving the true consideration given.
Of course, the description in the deed can be fitted to the land only
by parol.44 But this does not mean that the description can be varied
45
by parol evidence.
Notes
For obvious reasons, notes and drafts are not in any court subject
to the parol evidence rule to the same extent as other contracts. Parties
"7 Boone v. Boone, 217 N. C. 722, 9 S. E. 2d 383 (1940).
8 Bost v. Bost, 234 N. C. 554, 67 S. E. 2d 745 (1951).
" 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 645 (Rev. ed. 1936) ; 3 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 587
(1951) ; Chadbourn and McCormick, op. cit. spra note 1 at p. 159.
, Reidsville Grocery Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 215 N. C. 223, 1 S. E. 2d 535
(1939).
' Oliver v. Hecht, 207 N. C. 481, 177 S. E. 399 (1934).
42 Chadbourn and McCormick, op. cit. supra note 1 at p. 159-160.
'3214 N. C. 723, 200 S. E. 865 (1939). This is in accord with the weight of
authority; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2437 (3d ed. 1940). The claim in O'Briant v.
Lee that a debtor-creditor relation existed between the parties ultimately failed
for insufficient evidence; 212 N. C. 793, 195 S. E. 15 (1938), 216 N. C. 807, 6
S. E. 2d 836 (1940).
"Skipper v. Yow, 238 N. C. 659, 78 S. E. 2d 600 (1953).
"Brown v. Hodges, 232 N. C. 57, 61 S. E. 2d 603, rehearing denied, 233
N. C. 617, 65 S. E. 2d 144 (1951).
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drawing these agreements tend to follow a form which is rather definitely
standardized. If any collateral terms and conditions have been agreed
upon, they may likely be omitted from the instrument because their
inclusion would raise doubts, at least, as to negotiability, which is often
a prime requisite. Accordingly, it is rather common for promissory
notes to be no more than partial integrations, and parol evidence may
well be admissible as between the original parties, so far as it is not
46
inconsistent with express terms of the note.
Outside of North Carolina it is not generally true that parol evidence
may be used to contradict directly the promises made in the note. In
general, a maker defending an action by the payee to collect on a note
promising to pay $1,000 will not be allowed to prove that it was orally
agreed, when the note was signed, either that the obligation might be
discharged by delivery of cotton instead of dollars, or that the maker was
obligated only to the extent that he realized the necessary funds from
the sale of a stock feeding device. 47 However, decisions have been
reached in North Carolina allowing such evidence where rights of a
holder in due course are not involved, and the usual explanation is that
48
parol evidence is admissible as to the "mode of payment" of a note.
Evidence as to mode of payment is often described in this jurisdiction as
neither adding to nor varying the writing.49 An insurance agent, defending an action to collect a note given for money which he had borrowed from his company, was allowed to prove that when the note was
given the parties orally agreed that it was to be paid only to the extent
that his insurance commissions supplied the funds. 50 Defendant's parol
evidence on this oral agreement was convincing, being supported by a
witness who had been plaintiff's general manager at the time the note
was delivered. But most payees would see a difference between "I
promise to pay $1,000" and "I promise to pay $1,000 if I earn that
much in commissions."
The North Carolina rule that parol evidence is admissible to prove
mode of payment of a note has been construed to allow proof that the
signer was under no personal obligation to pay, such obligation resting
upon a person not referred to in the writing. The Stack case is a sur409 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2443 (3d ed. 1940) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 644
(Rev. ed. 1936) ; 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 587 (1951).
" 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 644 (Rev. ed. 1936); 9 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 2444 (3d ed. 1940) ; 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS pp. 307-308 (1951).
" Kerchner v. McRae, 80 N. C. 219 (1870)

(parol evidence allowed of "agree-

ment.., td give defendants a credit on their bond for the cotton. ...")
Parol evidence that note was to be paid from proceeds of sale of stock feeder,
49

and that "if there were no sales, there was to be no payment."

"In such a case there is no violation of the familiar

..

. rule

The court said:

. . . because

in the

sense of that rule the written contract is neither contradicted, added to, nor
varied.... ." Evans v. Freeman, 142 N. C. 61, 64, 54 S. E. 847, 848 (1906).

"0Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Guin, 215 N. C. 92, 1 S. E. 2d 123 (1939).
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prising application of the rule. J. E. Stack, director of the Bank of
Union, was indebted to the bank in the amount of $80,000, which was in
excess of the limit allowed by law under the circumstances. The bank
examiner insisted that this debt be reduced. Stack and his brother-inlaw Blakeney, who was president of the bank, met this demand by
getting notes from several of Stack's sons and heirs at law for some
$40,000 of the indebtedness. These notes were secured by mortgages
on land which J. E. Stack transferred to the makers for that purpose.
When action was brought on the notes, Stack's sons claimed that the
conveyance was a makeshift to help the bank, and that no liability
was to attach to them, the whole transaction being "fixed up" by
Blakeney. The court, apparently summarizing the claims of the makers
of the notes, said: "The heirs at law were to assume no liability, but
the indebtedness was to be paid out of the land. * * * It was well understood by the parties ...

that the makers were not to be responsible, but

it was J. E. Stack's debt and he was to remain liable therefor. .. ."
Blakeney testified: "I did not tell the signers of these notes... that they
would not be held personally liable for the payment thereof. I told them
that the property would stand between them and any other liability...."
The Bank of Union was apparently being liquidated by the state. The
lower court overruled all objections to the parol evidence offered by the
makers of the notes, and entered judgment that the Commissioner of
Banks take nothing as against the Stack heirs. The Commissioner appealed, and the decision was affirmed, the court stating:
"We think the main question of law involved in this controversy
is: In an action between the payee and maker of a note, is parol
evidence admissible to establish an agreement between the maker
and payee creating a particular mode of payment? We think so
under the facts and circumstances of this case."51
The court then added:
"On this record in what is written and what is in parol we can
see no 'total inconsistency.' The widow and certain of the children . . . did what was requested of them by the husband and

father, in an effort to aid the adjustment of honest obligations
to the bank, which was beyond the law limit allowed to one individual * * * the whole matter was without consideration and an
accommodation for their father, and the transactions were in
effect indirect mortgages of J. E. Stack by certain of his children,
52
for the purpose of adjusting honest debts.1

1Stack v. Stack, 202 N. C. 461,. 466, 163 S. E. 589, 591 (1932).
2 1d. at 469, 163 S. E. at 593.
11
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The promissory notes, then, signed by A. M. Stack and other Stack
heirs were allowed to be shown by parol evidence to be the legal obligations, not of A. M. Stack, but of J. E. Stack. The Commissioner of
Banks presumably relied on these notes as obligations of the Stack
children, not of their father; this difference was sufficient to show compliance with, rather than violation of, the legal limitations that he had
the duty to enforce in the interest of solvency of the bank. But this
difference is not such inconsistency, according to the court, as to bar
parol evidence relieving the signers of their apparent obligation. When
the Commissioner of Banks sought to enforce the notes in the interest of
creditors of the bank, he found that he had no claim against the signers
of the notes, no personal claim except that against the father, which was
the claim he thought had been replaced on his demand.
Other decisions point to the same conclusion.5 3 On the other hand,
where the evidence offered by the signer does not point to another who
was to be liable, but simply indicates an undertaking by the payee that
the signer would not be liable, the court rejected the evidence as contradicting the writing.54
Where the payee is not involved, but the dispute is between other
parties to the paper, as to their relations to each other, parol evidence
is unobjectionable. 55 The note is intended first of all to indicate the
rights of the payee against all other parties; the rights and obligations
of these other parties as among themselves are often not intended to be
indicated in the writing, and must depend upon parol evidence.
CONCLUSION

The parol evidence rule seems to be applied with fair consistency in
North Carolina in obvious cases where the writing plainly declares the
intent of the parties to create an integration. And if there is no merger
clause, but the parol evidence is contradictory to the written contract,
the cases again give the obvious answer common in all the states; enforce
the writing, discard the parol terms.
In this latter situation, however, the North Carolina courts have
developed an odd concept of what terms are contradictory, especially
where the writing is a promissory note. These courts see no contradiction between the written, absolute, unconditional promise and a parol
limitation of the obligation to the proceeds of a specific fund, or even
an oral understanding that the obligation shall rest not upon the signer
" Justice v. CQxe, 198 N. C. 263, 151 S. E. 252 (1930); Galloway v. Thrash,
207 N. C. 165, 176 S. E. 303 (1934) ; Bank of Chapel Hill v. Rosenstein, 207 N. C.
529, 177 S. E. 643 (1935).
"' Industrial Loan etc. Bank v. Dardine, 207 N. C. 509, 177 S. E. 635 (1935) ;

Coral Gables Inc. v. Ayres, 208 N. C. 426, 181 S. E. 263 (1935).
"Raleigh Banking & Trust Co. v. York, 199 N. C. 624, 155 S. E. 263 (1930) ;
Furr v. Trull, 205 N. C. 417, 171 S. E. 641 (1933).
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but upon another. It is not easy to say how a promissory note could
be drawn so that the contract enforceable in these courts would be the
promise signed in writing and nothing else. Even if a merger clause
were included in the note, the statements in so many of the decisions
that a parol agreement as to the mode of payment does not "add to,
vary, nor contradict" the promise to pay, if taken literally, would afford
a basis for enforcing such an oral agreement. It is not unlikely that,
because of this modification of the parol evidence rule, there are an unusual number of cases in which the promissory note obligation is sought
to be limited.
Neither in this state nor elsewhere is there a simple, satisfactory
answer for the problem when the writing contains no merger clause, and
no written statement inconsistent with the parol evidence offered. The
signed instrument may then be taken to indicate an intent that it be
treated either as a complete integration, excluding the parol evidence, or
as a partial integration, to be considered with the parol evidence. Often
the circumstances make one conclusion about as reasonable as the other.
Some courts emphasize the importance of protecting the written instrument from invasion, and thus enabling the careful man to protect himself by getting the whole of his contract in writing. The emphasis in
North Carolina is rather in the direction of giving the proponent of the
oral agreement a chance to prove that it was made, if he can. In the
absence of a merger clause, there is a tendency in many of the decisions
to receive any parol evidence which it not directly contradictory to some
statement in the writing. The decision in Evans v. Freeman is often
quoted, and still more often followed, in such cases:
"But this rule applies only when the entire contract has been reduced to writing, for if merely a part has been written, and the
other part left in parol, it is competent to establish the latter
part by oral evidence, provided it does not conflict with what
has been written. * * * In such a case there is no violation of the
familiar and elementary rule we have before mentioned, because
in the sense of that rule the written contract is neither contradicted, added to, nor varied; but leaving it in full force and operation as it has been expressed by the parties in the writing, the
other part of the contract is permitted to be shown in order to
round it out and present it in its completeness, the same as if
all of it had been committed to writing."' 6
This is parol evidence heresy by the Williston standard, 7 and to say
56142 N. C.61, 64, 54 S.E.847, 848 (1906).
But Williston states that "the tendency of the courts istoward increasing
liberality in the admission of parol agreements." 3 WiLLisToN, CoNMAcrs p.
1835 (Rev. ed. 1936).
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that the "written contract" is not "added to" by the oral evidence seems
to be a self-contradictory statement by the standard of ordinary langu-.
age. The expression "written contract" would usually be taken to mean
the "contract as written," or the "writing," or the "instrument"; and
if the oral evidence does not add anything to the writing, how can the
oral evidence "round out" the writing to "completeness," as if all of the
parties' agreement "had been committed to writing"? Or, for that
matter, if the oral evidence does not add to, vary, or contradict the
writing, why should one litigant be so anxious to get the oral evidence
into the record, and the other so anxious to keep it out?
Undoubtedly what the court meant in the quotation from Evans v.
Freeman was that the parol agreement did not add to, contradict, or vary
the whole contract that the parties made, because the parol agreement
was a part of that whole contract, the writing being the other part.
But the basis for this conclusion appears to be simply the evidence that
the parol agreement had been made in the course of the negotiations leading to the signed contract. In spite of what the court says, the decision in Evans v. Freeman, and many other local decisions, point to
the rule that, in the absence of a merger clause, parol evidence of an
additional promise made in the course of the negotiations may be con-,
sidered as part of the contract, provided it does not contradict something in the writing. This is opposed to the basic hypothesis upon
which the rule is founded, that normally, when the parties place their
agreement on paper, they aim to make a complete record of all terms
and conditions in the final agreement, which may well omit promises
agreed upon provisionally in the course of negotiations--omit them be-.
cause they are abandoned.
In the absence of a merger clause the authorities admit the possibility of a partial integration, though they differ as to the test to be
used in deciding whether the writing should be treated as a complete,
or only a partial integration. But the North Carolina rule almost
denies the possibility of a complete integration, once evidence is offered
of a non-contradictory parol agreement. The proof that an additional
parol term was agreed to is per se proof that the integration was not
complete. The possibility that the agreement was made as part of the
provisional tentative arrangements preceding the final agreement, and
surrendered in the bargain finally signed, sealed and delivered-that
possibility seems to be ignored. Nowhere in the litigation does court or
jury squarely face the question-did the omission from the writing;
appear to be due to the fact that the parties did not regard the term as
obligatory between them, or that they looked upon it as obligatory, but

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

so separate from the other terms that it need not be referred to in the
writing?
On the other hand, the North Carolina decisions may sometimes
come closer to enforcing the contract which should be enforced than do
the more conservative authorities. It is by no means impossible that
the parties intended the oral term to be part of the sum total of their
obligations. They were negligent in omitting it from the writing; but
should their negligence interfere with enforcement of true intent once
that is established? The argument is not all one way. In doubtful
cases, the written contract deserves protection; the question is whether
the written contract deserves protection where the fact-finding tribunal
is satisfied that the writing does not state the whole agreement which,
judged from all the circumstances, the parties thought they were making
at the moment of signing.
It is not enough, however, that the oral agreement was "made";
that may be understood as referring simply to the uttering of a promise
during the course of negotiations, provisional upon the contract being
finally agreed upon. Let the tribunal determine, not only that the
parties made the oral agreement, but that they did not thereafter, by
omitting it from the writing or otherwise, show an intent to abandon
it; that they showed an intent to include that term, as well as what
was written, in their final bargain, and the basis for enforcement of the
oral agreement would be substantial. The danger in this course is also
substantial; the parol evidence, if not inconsistent with the writing, cannot be excluded altogether. The determination as to whether the oral
agreement was made, and whether it was abandoned, can hardly be
reached without considering what the alleged oral agreement was. Corbin has pointed out that the parol evidence rule, as applied even in the
conservative courts, does not completely exclude the parol evidence.
Possibly the court, rather than the jury, should be charged with the
duty of deciding whether the parol term was apparently intended by the
parties to be effective or not; this would be consistent with the theory
of Professor McCormick. 5 The resolution of the problem is difficult,
but it is necessarily resolved one way or the other in every decision where
it arises, and the chances that it will be more fairly resolved in line with
the agreement relied upon will be increased by facing the difficulty
frankly.
3 CoR~iN, CoNTRAcTs § 576 (1951).
McCormick, The ParolEvidence Rule as a ProceduralDevice for the Control
of the Jury, 41 YALE L. J. 365 (1932).

